

Demonizing the Enemy: The Influence of Russian State-Sponsored Media on American Audiences

Supplementary Online Appendix

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Appendix A: Measures

Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the following countries. *United States; Russia; Ukraine; China*

1. Very unfavorable
2. Somewhat unfavorable
3. Neither favorable nor unfavorable
4. Somewhat favorable
5. Very favorable
6. Don't know

Would you say your overall opinion of these countries' foreign policy is very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable? *United States foreign policy; Russian foreign policy; Ukrainian foreign policy; Chinese foreign policy*

1. Very unfavorable
2. Somewhat unfavorable
3. Neither favorable nor unfavorable
4. Somewhat favorable
5. Very favorable
6. Don't know

Would you say your overall opinion towards the following leaders is very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable? *Barack Obama; Vladimir Putin, Petro Poroshenko*

1. Very unfavorable
2. Somewhat unfavorable
3. Neither favorable nor unfavorable
4. Somewhat favorable
5. Very favorable
6. Don't know

In response to the situation involving Russia and Ukraine, would you favor or oppose the United States doing the following actions? *Increasing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia; arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government*

1. Strongly oppose
2. Somewhat oppose
3. Neither favor or oppose
4. Somewhat favor
5. Strongly favor
6. Don't know

How important to the interests of the United States is what happens between Russia and Ukraine?

1. Extremely important
2. Very important
3. Moderately important
4. Slightly important
5. Not at all important

How much, if anything, have you read or heard about tensions between Russia and Ukraine over territory in eastern Ukraine?

1. A great deal
2. A lot
3. A moderately amount
4. A little
5. Nothing at all

Appendix B: Survey Sample Characteristics

Table 1: Summary Table

	No.	%
Age Cohort		
18-29	277.00	31.30
30-49	442.00	49.94
50+	166.00	18.76
Total	885.00	100.00
Female		
Male	403.00	45.54
Female	482.00	54.46
Total	885.00	100.00
White		
Non-white	194.00	21.92
White	691.00	78.08
Total	885.00	100.00
Education		
High School	79.00	8.93
Some College	315.00	35.59
College	340.00	38.42
Post Graduate	151.00	17.06
Total	885.00	100.00
Party		
Democrat	375.00	45.02
Republican	182.00	21.85
Independent	276.00	33.13
Total	833.00	100.00

Appendix C: Balance Test

Table 2: Balance Test

	treatments				Total No.
	Control No.	Info No.	Source No.	Intention No.	
Age Cohort					
18-29	71	69	69	68	277
30-49	112	114	113	103	442
50+	44	38	45	39	166
Total	227	221	227	210	885
Pearson chi2(6) =	0.7854	Pr =	0.992		
Female					
Male	101	108	100	94	403
Female	126	113	127	116	482
Total	227	221	227	210	885
Pearson chi2(3) =	1.3414	Pr =	0.719		
White					
Non-white	49	46	53	46	194
White	178	175	174	164	691
Total	227	221	227	210	885
Pearson chi2(3) =	0.4431	Pr =	0.931		
Education					
High School	23	15	22	19	79
Some College	79	82	80	74	315
College	90	87	86	77	340
Post Graduate	35	37	39	40	151
Total	227	221	227	210	885
Pearson chi2(9) =	3.0371	Pr =	0.963		
Party					
Democrat	93	92	97	93	375
Republican	50	49	45	38	182
Independent	70	69	70	67	276
Total	213	210	212	198	833
Pearson chi2(6) =	1.5349	Pr =	0.957		

Appendix D: Robustness Checks

I include the regression tables used to recreate the main figures in the paper. I also include robustness checks with controls, and the full sample. In the main text of the article, I excluded individuals who failed the following reading check after exposure to the treatment groups. Here, I include them and find the results are nearly identical.

Reading Check 1: Participants who received a treatment were asked whether the article they read was about: (1) Ukrainian human rights violations; (2) Russian human rights violations; (3) a Ukrainian corruption scandal; or (4) Russian corruption. Choices were randomized and individuals who did not answer correctly were removed.

Reading Check 2: Participants who received a treatment were asked what the source of the the article they read was. Individuals who did not answer correctly were removed.

Table 3: Regression Table for Figure 1

	Ukraine		Ukraine FP		Poroshenko		Russia		Russia FP		Putin	
	β	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>SE</i>
Info	-0.29*	(0.09)	-0.26*	(0.09)	-0.18	(0.09)	0.01	(0.10)	-0.00	(0.10)	-0.02	(0.11)
Source	-0.28*	(0.09)	-0.32*	(0.10)	-0.12	(0.09)	0.02	(0.10)	0.01	(0.10)	-0.03	(0.11)
Intention	-0.30*	(0.10)	-0.33*	(0.10)	-0.28*	(0.10)	-0.02	(0.11)	-0.11	(0.10)	-0.21	(0.11)
Constant	2.89*	(0.06)	2.81*	(0.07)	2.82*	(0.07)	2.19*	(0.07)	2.05*	(0.07)	2.13*	(0.08)
Observations	808		689		580		819		774		808	
R-Squared	.018		.024		.015		.0002		.0021		.0047	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: OLS regression. Only includes individuals who passed reading checks.

* $p < 0.05$

Table 4: Regression Table for Figure 2

	Sanctions		Arms	
	β	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>SE</i>
Info	0.07	(0.11)	-0.02	(0.11)
Source	-0.05	(0.12)	-0.13	(0.11)
Intention	-0.06	(0.13)	-0.25*	(0.12)
Constant	3.30*	(0.08)	2.44*	(0.08)
Observations	803		808	
R-Squared	.0016		.007	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: OLS regression.

* $p < 0.05$

Table 5: Full Sample Robustness Check

	Ukraine		Ukraine FP		Poroshenko		Russia		Russia FP		Putin	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
Info	-0.26*	(0.09)	-0.27*	(0.09)	-0.18	(0.09)	0.01	(0.10)	-0.00	(0.10)	-0.01	(0.11)
Source	-0.24*	(0.09)	-0.30*	(0.09)	-0.09	(0.09)	-0.01	(0.10)	-0.02	(0.10)	-0.06	(0.11)
Intention	-0.24*	(0.09)	-0.26*	(0.10)	-0.23*	(0.10)	0.01	(0.10)	-0.05	(0.10)	-0.12	(0.11)
Constant	2.89*	(0.06)	2.81*	(0.07)	2.82*	(0.07)	2.19*	(0.07)	2.05*	(0.07)	2.13*	(0.08)
Observations	866		743		629		877		831		866	
R-Squared	.013		.018		.011		.000086		.00041		.0017	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: OLS regression. Includes individuals who failed reading checks.

* $p < 0.05$

Table 6: Full Sample Robustness Check

Info	0.06	(0.11)	0.00	(0.11)
Source	-0.05	(0.12)	-0.09	(0.11)
Intention	-0.02	(0.12)	-0.16	(0.11)
Constant	3.30*	(0.08)	2.44*	(0.08)
Observations	858		865	
R-Squared	.0011		.0031	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: OLS regression.

* $p < 0.05$

Table 7: Treatment Effects with Controls

	Ukraine		Ukraine FP		Poroshenko		Russia		Russia FP		Putin	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Info	-0.30*	(0.09)	-0.30*	(0.09)	-0.14	(0.09)	-0.01	(0.10)	-0.10	(0.10)	-0.02	(0.11)
Source	-0.30*	(0.09)	-0.37*	(0.10)	-0.12	(0.10)	-0.04	(0.10)	-0.11	(0.10)	-0.08	(0.11)
Intention	-0.29*	(0.10)	-0.34*	(0.10)	-0.24*	(0.10)	-0.03	(0.10)	-0.17	(0.10)	-0.21	(0.11)
Republican	0.05	(0.08)	0.04	(0.08)	0.02	(0.08)	0.13	(0.08)	0.22*	(0.08)	0.35*	(0.10)
Independent	-0.05	(0.10)	0.05	(0.10)	-0.22*	(0.10)	0.24*	(0.11)	0.21*	(0.10)	0.26*	(0.12)
Female	-0.07	(0.07)	-0.09	(0.07)	-0.18*	(0.07)	-0.02	(0.07)	0.01	(0.07)	-0.03	(0.08)
30-49	-0.04	(0.08)	0.06	(0.08)	0.00	(0.08)	-0.22*	(0.08)	-0.17*	(0.08)	-0.05	(0.09)
50+	-0.02	(0.10)	0.12	(0.10)	0.04	(0.10)	-0.35*	(0.10)	-0.32*	(0.10)	-0.19	(0.12)
White	-0.03	(0.08)	-0.02	(0.09)	0.03	(0.09)	-0.07	(0.09)	-0.01	(0.09)	-0.12	(0.11)
Some College	-0.13	(0.16)	-0.13	(0.14)	-0.08	(0.17)	-0.24	(0.15)	-0.18	(0.14)	-0.30	(0.18)
College	-0.05	(0.16)	0.02	(0.14)	-0.12	(0.17)	-0.31*	(0.15)	-0.21	(0.14)	-0.43*	(0.18)
Post Graduate	0.10	(0.17)	0.08	(0.15)	-0.02	(0.18)	-0.49*	(0.16)	-0.50*	(0.15)	-0.67*	(0.19)
Knowledge Ukraine	0.06	(0.03)	0.03	(0.04)	-0.04	(0.04)	-0.11*	(0.04)	-0.18*	(0.04)	-0.05	(0.04)
Constant	2.86*	(0.20)	2.78*	(0.19)	3.07*	(0.22)	2.92*	(0.21)	2.89*	(0.20)	2.69*	(0.24)
Observations	768		653		551		776		734		765	
R-Squared	.039		.046		.034		.057		.097		.06	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: OLS regression. Only includes individuals who passed reading checks.

* $p < 0.05$

Table 8: Treatment Effects with Controls

Info	0.12	(0.11)	-0.02	(0.12)
Source	0.05	(0.12)	-0.08	(0.12)
Intention	-0.05	(0.12)	-0.25*	(0.12)
Republican	-0.32*	(0.10)	0.14	(0.10)
Independent	-0.52*	(0.14)	-0.35*	(0.12)
Female	-0.12	(0.09)	-0.09	(0.08)
30-49	0.20*	(0.10)	-0.07	(0.10)
50+	0.36*	(0.13)	0.20	(0.12)
White	-0.02	(0.11)	-0.02	(0.11)
Some College	0.06	(0.17)	-0.30	(0.18)
College	0.25	(0.17)	-0.12	(0.19)
Post Graduate	0.47*	(0.19)	-0.14	(0.20)
Knowledge Ukraine	0.18*	(0.04)	0.20*	(0.04)
Constant	2.70*	(0.25)	2.17*	(0.24)
Observations	762		766	
R-Squared	.089		.08	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: OLS regression.

* $p < 0.05$

Appendix E: Comparison Between Treatments

I Include two figures that demonstrate differences in individual attitudes toward Ukraine and Russia across all the treatment groups, allowing me to test how the *source* and *intention* treatment groups differ from the *information* group.




Figure 1: I obtain the pairwise differences of the mean of favorability toward Ukraine across the levels of the treatments and adjust the p-values and confidence intervals for multiple comparisons using Tukey's Honest Significant Difference test (HSD).




Figure 2: I obtain the pairwise differences of the mean of favorability toward Russia across the levels of the treatments and adjust the p-values and confidence intervals for multiple comparisons using Tukey's Honest Significant Difference test (HSD).

Appendix F: Heterogenous Treatment Effects

I present models with interactions with partisanship, political ideology, level of education, and level of knowledge about Ukraine. I do find that Democrats and Independents are more likely to adopt negative views of Ukraine after exposure to a *RT* news post.¹ It is possible that knowledge that the Ukrainian government is violating human rights can lessen support for Ukraine in more liberal voters since liberals tend to be more sensitive to the use of force in foreign policy than conservatives (Kertzer and Brutger 2016, 235). Prior work also finds that Democrats tend to see foreign voices as more credible than Republicans (Guardino and Hayes 2017, p. 3). Scholars emphasize that Republicans' greater levels of ethnocentrism and distrust of foreign nations makes them less receptive to foreign cues (Brewer et al. 2004; Dragojlovic 2015; Kinder and Kam 2009). Yet, I would expect partisanship to have varying moderating effects based on the topic of the foreign media message. As recent reports on Russian propaganda made clear, the Kremlin was adept at targeting both the far-left and the far-right with their strategic information campaigns in the United States (Howard et al. 2018). Moreover, the results tend to be sensitive to whether one classifies "leaners" as partisans.

¹See Online Appendix F for regression tables.

Table 9: Treatment Effects on Views of Ukraine and Russia with Party Interactions

	Ukraine		Ukraine FP		Poroshenko		Russia		Russia FP		Putin	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Info	-0.35*	(0.10)	-0.24*	(0.10)	-0.10	(0.11)	-0.13	(0.11)	-0.08	(0.10)	-0.04	(0.10)
Source	-0.26*	(0.11)	-0.22*	(0.11)	-0.16	(0.11)	-0.13	(0.10)	-0.06	(0.10)	-0.04	(0.10)
Intention	-0.24*	(0.11)	-0.25*	(0.10)	-0.22*	(0.11)	-0.13	(0.10)	-0.12	(0.09)	-0.18	(0.09)
Republican	-0.10	(0.13)	0.00	(0.14)	-0.13	(0.14)	-0.05	(0.13)	0.14	(0.13)	0.08	(0.13)
Independent	0.03	(0.11)	0.14	(0.12)	0.05	(0.11)	-0.05	(0.12)	0.02	(0.11)	0.10	(0.12)
Info X Republican	0.44*	(0.18)	0.18	(0.18)	0.25	(0.18)	0.25	(0.18)	0.01	(0.17)	0.10	(0.19)
Info X Independent	0.06	(0.16)	-0.11	(0.16)	-0.19	(0.16)	0.14	(0.16)	0.07	(0.15)	0.13	(0.17)
Source X Republican	0.16	(0.19)	0.10	(0.19)	0.38	(0.20)	0.31	(0.19)	0.12	(0.19)	0.32	(0.20)
Source X Independent	-0.02	(0.16)	-0.22	(0.16)	-0.11	(0.16)	0.11	(0.15)	-0.07	(0.14)	-0.11	(0.16)
Intention X Republican	0.18	(0.20)	0.09	(0.19)	0.30	(0.21)	0.13	(0.19)	0.08	(0.18)	0.30	(0.21)
Intention X Independent	-0.02	(0.16)	-0.04	(0.16)	-0.10	(0.16)	0.28	(0.16)	0.09	(0.14)	0.12	(0.16)
Female	-0.04	(0.05)	-0.03	(0.05)	-0.13*	(0.05)	-0.05	(0.05)	-0.05	(0.05)	-0.05	(0.05)
30-49	-0.01	(0.06)	0.07	(0.06)	0.02	(0.06)	-0.10	(0.06)	-0.10	(0.05)	0.01	(0.06)
50+	0.04	(0.08)	0.11	(0.07)	0.06	(0.07)	-0.15*	(0.07)	-0.16*	(0.06)	-0.07	(0.07)
White	-0.05	(0.06)	0.01	(0.07)	0.01	(0.07)	-0.07	(0.06)	0.00	(0.06)	-0.04	(0.07)
Some College	-0.14	(0.11)	-0.10	(0.10)	-0.13	(0.11)	-0.17	(0.10)	-0.07	(0.09)	-0.22	(0.11)
College	-0.03	(0.11)	-0.03	(0.09)	-0.15	(0.11)	-0.25*	(0.10)	-0.13	(0.09)	-0.32*	(0.11)
Post Graduate	0.03	(0.12)	0.01	(0.11)	-0.08	(0.12)	-0.35*	(0.11)	-0.23*	(0.09)	-0.43*	(0.12)
Knowledge Ukraine	0.05*	(0.02)	0.03	(0.03)	-0.02	(0.03)	-0.04	(0.02)	-0.07*	(0.02)	-0.00	(0.03)
Constant	1.96*	(0.16)	1.76*	(0.15)	2.11*	(0.17)	1.96*	(0.16)	1.80*	(0.14)	1.75*	(0.16)
Observations	768		653		551		776		734		765	
R-Squared	.051		.056		.053		.046		.062		.061	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: OLS regression. Only includes individuals who passed reading checks.

* $p < 0.05$

Table 10: Treatment Effects on Views of Ukraine and Russia with Political Ideology Interactions

	Ukraine		Ukraine FP		Poroshenko		Russia		Russia FP		Putin	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Info	-0.34*	(0.10)	-0.17	(0.10)	-0.06	(0.10)	-0.17	(0.10)	-0.09	(0.09)	-0.03	(0.10)
Source	-0.25*	(0.10)	-0.24*	(0.10)	-0.18	(0.11)	-0.10	(0.10)	-0.10	(0.09)	-0.03	(0.10)
Intention	-0.16	(0.10)	-0.13	(0.10)	-0.21*	(0.11)	-0.11	(0.10)	-0.10	(0.09)	-0.13	(0.11)
Moderate	-0.05	(0.12)	0.24*	(0.11)	0.14	(0.12)	0.03	(0.11)	0.07	(0.11)	0.12	(0.12)
Conservative	0.00	(0.12)	0.07	(0.11)	-0.11	(0.12)	-0.14	(0.11)	0.03	(0.10)	0.07	(0.12)
Info X Moderate	0.11	(0.18)	-0.09	(0.17)	-0.31	(0.18)	-0.00	(0.17)	-0.02	(0.16)	0.02	(0.18)
Info X Conservative	0.29	(0.16)	-0.01	(0.15)	0.00	(0.16)	0.49*	(0.16)	0.20	(0.14)	0.20	(0.16)
Source X Moderate	0.12	(0.18)	0.07	(0.17)	-0.07	(0.18)	0.07	(0.17)	0.13	(0.16)	-0.03	(0.18)
Source X Conservative	0.05	(0.17)	0.01	(0.16)	0.31	(0.17)	0.31	(0.16)	0.13	(0.15)	0.26	(0.17)
Intention X Moderate	-0.17	(0.17)	-0.40*	(0.16)	-0.16	(0.17)	0.16	(0.17)	0.09	(0.15)	0.08	(0.18)
Intention X Conservative	0.02	(0.18)	0.01	(0.17)	0.20	(0.18)	0.28	(0.18)	0.11	(0.16)	0.26	(0.18)
Female	-0.04	(0.05)	-0.01	(0.05)	-0.12*	(0.05)	-0.03	(0.05)	-0.01	(0.05)	-0.04	(0.05)
30-49	-0.03	(0.06)	0.07	(0.06)	0.01	(0.06)	-0.13*	(0.06)	-0.12*	(0.05)	-0.00	(0.06)
50+	0.01	(0.07)	0.10	(0.07)	0.05	(0.07)	-0.19*	(0.07)	-0.17*	(0.07)	-0.08	(0.08)
White	-0.05	(0.06)	0.02	(0.06)	0.02	(0.06)	-0.07	(0.06)	0.00	(0.06)	-0.03	(0.06)
Some College	-0.18	(0.10)	-0.11	(0.09)	-0.11	(0.10)	-0.18	(0.09)	-0.06	(0.09)	-0.24*	(0.10)
College	-0.08	(0.10)	-0.05	(0.09)	-0.14	(0.10)	-0.27*	(0.09)	-0.14	(0.09)	-0.35*	(0.10)
Post Graduate	0.02	(0.11)	0.01	(0.10)	-0.06	(0.11)	-0.33*	(0.10)	-0.23*	(0.10)	-0.44*	(0.11)
Knowledge Ukraine	0.04	(0.02)	0.03	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.02)	-0.06*	(0.02)	0.01	(0.02)
Constant	2.02*	(0.15)	1.70*	(0.14)	2.05*	(0.15)	1.95*	(0.14)	1.77*	(0.13)	1.71*	(0.15)
Observations	807		688		579		818		773		807	
R-Squared	.051		.062		.044		.05		.053		.056	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: OLS regression. Only includes individuals who passed reading checks.

* $p < 0.05$

Table 11: Treatment Effects on Views of Ukraine and Russia with Education Interactions

	Ukraine		Ukraine FP		Poroshenko		Russia		Russia FP		Putin	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Info	-0.28	(0.24)	-0.35	(0.24)	0.02	(0.25)	0.01	(0.24)	-0.13	(0.23)	-0.39	(0.25)
Source	0.32	(0.22)	0.18	(0.21)	0.31	(0.23)	0.26	(0.21)	0.27	(0.19)	0.10	(0.22)
Intention	-0.04	(0.28)	-0.37	(0.25)	0.02	(0.27)	-0.09	(0.27)	0.08	(0.24)	-0.32	(0.28)
Some College	0.01	(0.17)	0.01	(0.17)	0.09	(0.19)	-0.17	(0.17)	0.03	(0.16)	-0.41*	(0.18)
College	0.14	(0.17)	0.05	(0.17)	0.15	(0.18)	-0.16	(0.16)	-0.04	(0.16)	-0.41*	(0.17)
Post Graduate	0.24	(0.20)	0.15	(0.19)	0.13	(0.21)	-0.13	(0.19)	-0.03	(0.18)	-0.53*	(0.20)
Info X Some College	0.15	(0.27)	0.14	(0.26)	-0.10	(0.27)	-0.01	(0.26)	0.15	(0.25)	0.55*	(0.28)
Info X College	-0.07	(0.27)	0.19	(0.26)	-0.24	(0.27)	0.02	(0.26)	0.13	(0.25)	0.40	(0.28)
Info X Post Graduate	0.09	(0.30)	0.14	(0.28)	-0.16	(0.30)	-0.19	(0.29)	-0.05	(0.27)	0.39	(0.31)
Source X Some College	-0.61*	(0.25)	-0.51*	(0.24)	-0.47	(0.26)	-0.10	(0.24)	-0.23	(0.22)	0.04	(0.25)
Source X College	-0.53*	(0.25)	-0.37	(0.23)	-0.43	(0.26)	-0.41	(0.24)	-0.35	(0.22)	-0.14	(0.25)
Source X Post Graduate	-0.67*	(0.28)	-0.56*	(0.27)	-0.48	(0.29)	-0.38	(0.27)	-0.48	(0.25)	-0.11	(0.28)
Intention X Some College	-0.20	(0.31)	0.16	(0.27)	-0.21	(0.30)	0.19	(0.29)	-0.19	(0.26)	0.35	(0.30)
Intention X College	-0.15	(0.31)	0.13	(0.27)	-0.35	(0.30)	0.10	(0.29)	-0.06	(0.26)	0.24	(0.30)
Intention X Post Graduate	-0.20	(0.33)	0.12	(0.30)	-0.08	(0.32)	-0.06	(0.31)	-0.19	(0.28)	0.36	(0.33)
Moderate	-0.03	(0.06)	0.15*	(0.06)	0.02	(0.06)	0.10	(0.06)	0.13*	(0.06)	0.15*	(0.07)
Conservative	0.10	(0.06)	0.08	(0.06)	0.02	(0.06)	0.15*	(0.06)	0.15*	(0.05)	0.25*	(0.06)
Female	-0.04	(0.05)	-0.02	(0.05)	-0.12*	(0.05)	-0.02	(0.05)	-0.01	(0.05)	-0.03	(0.05)
30-49	-0.03	(0.06)	0.05	(0.06)	0.01	(0.06)	-0.12*	(0.06)	-0.11*	(0.05)	0.01	(0.06)
50+	0.02	(0.07)	0.11	(0.07)	0.06	(0.07)	-0.17*	(0.07)	-0.16*	(0.07)	-0.06	(0.08)
White	-0.05	(0.06)	0.01	(0.06)	0.00	(0.06)	-0.06	(0.06)	-0.00	(0.06)	-0.04	(0.06)
Knowledge Ukraine	0.04	(0.02)	0.03	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.02)	-0.02	(0.02)	-0.06*	(0.02)	0.01	(0.02)
Constant	1.82*	(0.18)	1.64*	(0.18)	1.85*	(0.19)	1.75*	(0.17)	1.60*	(0.16)	1.74*	(0.18)
Observations	807		688		579		818		773		807	
R-Squared	.059		.064		.041		.048		.06		.06	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: OLS regression. Only includes individuals who passed reading checks.

* $p < 0.05$

Table 12: Treatment Effects on Views of Ukraine and Russia with Prior Knowledge Interactions

	Ukraine		Ukraine FP		Poroshenko		Russia		Russia FP		Putin	
	β	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>SE</i>	β	<i>SE</i>
Info	-0.26	(0.19)	-0.05	(0.18)	-0.20	(0.20)	0.05	(0.18)	0.13	(0.17)	-0.01	(0.19)
Source	-0.26	(0.19)	-0.12	(0.18)	0.17	(0.20)	0.11	(0.18)	-0.01	(0.17)	-0.12	(0.19)
Intention	-0.42*	(0.20)	-0.32	(0.19)	-0.44*	(0.20)	0.01	(0.19)	-0.01	(0.18)	-0.06	(0.21)
Knowledge Ukraine	0.02	(0.05)	0.05	(0.05)	-0.02	(0.05)	-0.00	(0.04)	-0.04	(0.04)	-0.01	(0.05)
Info X Knowledge Ukraine	0.01	(0.07)	-0.06	(0.06)	0.02	(0.07)	-0.03	(0.06)	-0.06	(0.06)	0.01	(0.07)
Source X Knowledge Ukraine	0.02	(0.06)	-0.04	(0.06)	-0.10	(0.07)	-0.04	(0.06)	-0.01	(0.06)	0.06	(0.07)
Intention X Knowledge Ukraine	0.08	(0.07)	0.03	(0.06)	0.08	(0.07)	0.00	(0.07)	-0.01	(0.06)	0.01	(0.07)
Moderate	-0.04	(0.06)	0.13*	(0.06)	0.02	(0.06)	0.10	(0.06)	0.12*	(0.06)	0.14*	(0.07)
Conservative	0.10	(0.06)	0.07	(0.06)	0.01	(0.06)	0.13*	(0.06)	0.14*	(0.05)	0.24*	(0.06)
Female	-0.04	(0.05)	-0.02	(0.05)	-0.12*	(0.05)	-0.02	(0.05)	-0.01	(0.05)	-0.04	(0.05)
30-49	-0.04	(0.06)	0.06	(0.06)	0.01	(0.06)	-0.12*	(0.06)	-0.11*	(0.05)	0.00	(0.06)
50+	0.02	(0.07)	0.10	(0.07)	0.05	(0.07)	-0.18*	(0.07)	-0.16*	(0.07)	-0.06	(0.07)
White	-0.04	(0.06)	0.02	(0.06)	0.02	(0.06)	-0.07	(0.06)	-0.00	(0.06)	-0.03	(0.06)
Some College	-0.17	(0.10)	-0.09	(0.09)	-0.10	(0.10)	-0.18	(0.09)	-0.06	(0.09)	-0.23*	(0.10)
College	-0.07	(0.10)	-0.03	(0.09)	-0.11	(0.10)	-0.26*	(0.09)	-0.14	(0.09)	-0.33*	(0.10)
Post Graduate	0.02	(0.11)	0.02	(0.10)	-0.06	(0.11)	-0.32*	(0.11)	-0.23*	(0.10)	-0.42*	(0.11)
Constant	2.04*	(0.17)	1.67*	(0.17)	2.04*	(0.18)	1.79*	(0.17)	1.65*	(0.16)	1.69*	(0.18)
Observations	807		688		579		818		773		807	
R-Squared	.044		.051		.042		.037		.05		.053	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Note: OLS regression. Only included individuals who passed reading checks.

* $p < 0.05$

Appendix G: Attitudes toward Russia

Influence of Russian Propaganda on Views toward Russia




Figure 3: Participants were asked their levels of favorability toward: Russia, Russian foreign policy, and Vladimir Putin. OLS with no controls. Sample includes individuals who passed reading checks. Figure plots the marginal effects of the treatments on each dependent variable.

Appendix H: BART

I acknowledge that looking for heterogeneous treatment effects covariate-by-covariate can lead to false discoveries (Gelman and Loken 2014). Therefore, I use Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART) – a sum-of-trees model that detects treatment effect heterogeneity and predicts the conditional mean of the outcome variable while minimizing overfitting to account for this issue in the Online Appendix (Guess and Coppock 2018, p. 13). While BART heterogeneous treatment effects cannot be summarized by looking at the coefficients on interaction terms, one can plot the estimated treatment effect on each individual’s covariate profile (y-axis) along with 95% confidence intervals. As these more robust models demonstrate, Russian messages tend to lower evaluations of Ukraine but do not have a significant effect on attitudes toward Russia itself (see **Figure 4** and **Figure 5**).




Figure 4: Bart Estimated Treatment Effects




Figure 5: Bart Estimated Treatment Effects

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